New World Order Report





The BLM/Trans Connection

Kevin Shipp July 28, 2020 


Black Lives Matter (BLM) is not only comprised of Marxist/Nation of Islam (NOI) leadership, but a significant number of BLM leaders and members are LBGTQ and Transgender activists. Two of the founders of BLM began as committed LBGTQ activists. Because of this, a significant number of BLM members are also Transgender. Transgender members have been caught changing shirts during protests, first posing as BLM, then changing into Antifa shirts and then changing into shirts posing as, “Moms” who have joined the movement. 

It is clear, once again, that BLM is not about Black civil rights, something we all hold dear. BLM rebels against the non-violent racial unity philosophy of Martin Luther King (MLK). What made MLK’s movement so successful was the fact that it was non-violent and based on King’s long held Christian values. Based on the statements made by its leaders, BLM has no intention of being peaceful, decries racial unity and espouses the Nation of Islam’s anti-Christian view that white people are devils and Jews are descended from apes. 

BLM leaders make it clear that the movement has one goal, to overturn the current capitalist and Constitutional system and replace it with a Marxist system based on Black supremacy. It is also determined to assault and remove police officers from civilian life and empty prisons in US cities. BLM has formed a new Black Panther Party and several Black, heavily armed militias have formed and are marching in the streets of America. 


This is a clear and present danger to law and order in America and an assault on the unity of Black and White Americans found in Christian churches around the country; churches that stand on the principles taught by MLK. As the BLM/NOI/Transgender movement escalates its violence, and it will, it is highly likely that a counter revolution will begin, when peace loving Americans have had enough. The result could be a serious, civil war. Somehow, State and Federal governments must come up with a strategy to keep this from happening and maintain law and order in the streets of America. As long as Democratic governors of blue states defund and stand down police departments and allow protestors to loot, damage property and threaten citizens, there will be no local solution, only escalating anarchy.

Image Attribution: Racey Knight / Public domain



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** This is prime evidence the Council on Foreign Relations should be dismantled and liquidated! 

They have been a One World Organization from their creation. They are exasperated because our new president, who is pro America and not a part of this evil cabal is standing up to them and dismantling their system they have worked hard for decades to establish! 

This report reveals it all!
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WIKILEAKS EXPOSES HOW COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CONTROLS MOST ALL MAINSTREAM MEDIA

January 31, 2018 A Media Comments Offon WikiLeaks Exposes How Council on Foreign Relations Controls Most All Mainstream Media


It is no secret that over the last 4 decades, mainstream media has been consolidated from dozens of competing companies to only six. Hundreds of channels, websites, news outlets, newspapers, and magazines, making up ninety percent of all media is controlled by very few people—giving Americans the illusion of choice.

While six companies controlling most everything the Western world consumes in regard to media may sound like a sinister arrangement, the Swiss Propaganda Research center (SPR) has just released information that is even worse.
The research group was able to tie all these media companies to a single organization—the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Defend Assange Campaign@DefendAssange

Council on Foreign Relations links to major media holdings

Full graphic here: https://swprs.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/cfr-media-network-hdv-spr.png …



11:07 PM - Jan 28, 2018

For those who may be unaware, the CFR is a primary member of the circle of Washington think-tanks promoting endless war. As former Army Major Todd Pierce describes, this group acts as “primary provocateurs” using “‘psychological suggestiveness’ to create a false narrative of danger from some foreign entity with the objective being to create paranoia within the U.S. population that it is under imminent threat of attack or takeover.”

A senior member of the CFR and outspoken neocon warmonger, Robert Kagan has even publicly proclaimed that the 
US should create an empire.

The narrative created by CFR and its cohorts is picked up by their secondary communicators, also known the mainstream media, who push it on the populace with no analysis or questioning.

When looking at the chart from SPR, the reach by this single organization is so vast that it is no mystery as to how these elite psychopaths guide Americans into accepting endless war at the expense of their mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters.

Top journalists and executives from all major media companies are integrated into the CFR. As the chart below illustrates, the CFR has even more control in the mainstream media than even the nefarious Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission.

                                                                   
As SPR points out, Richard Harwood, former managing editor and ombudsman of the Washington Post, wrote about the Council on Foreign Relations Recognizing that its members most likely correspond to what one might call the “ruling establishment of the United States.”

Harwood continued, “The membership of these journalists in the council, however they may think of themselves, is an acknowledgment of their active and important role in public affairs and of their ascension into the American ruling class. They do not merely analyze and interpret foreign policy for the United States; they help make it.”

Let that sink in. This group of unaccountable, un-elected, professional propagandists in America doesn’t simply analyze US government policy—they make it.

YouTube Video


While only five percent of the members of CFR work within the media, as SPR points out that is all they need to implement the will of its other members that includes: several US presidents and vice presidents of both parties; almost all foreign, defense and finance ministers; most chiefs of staff and commanders of the US military and NATO; nearly all National Security Advisers, CIA Directors, UN Ambassadors, Fed Chairmen, World Bank Presidents, and Directors of the National Economic Council; some of the most influential members of Congress (especially foreign and security politicians); numerous media managers and top journalists, as well as some of the most famous actors; numerous prominent academics, especially in the key areas of economics, international relations, political and historical sciences, and journalism; numerous executives from think tanks, universities, NGOs, and Wall Street; and key members of the 9/11 Commission and the Warren Commission (JFK)

To highlight just how much control over the media the CFR wields we need only look at the fact that they operate—in the open—and receive nearly no media coverage. The former chairman of the CFR, High Commissioner for Germany, co-founder of the Atlantic Bridge, World Bank president, and an adviser to a total of nine US presidents, John J. McCloy actually bragged publicly about the CFR hand picking US politicians.

“Whenever we needed a man [in Washington], we just thumbed through theroll of Council members and put through a call to New York [to the CFR’s headquarters office],” said McCloy.

Until the election of Trump the past four presidents have been the director of the CFR, George HW Bush, who was replaced by a member of the CFR, Bill Clinton, who was replaced by a family member of the CFR, George W Bush, who was then replaced by CFR aspirant candidate Barack Obama—who filled his cabinet with members of the elite group.

Although Donald Trump was never a public member of the CFR, that did not stop him from filling the White House with dozens of CFR members.

Here are just a few of the CFR members appointed by Trump: Elaine Chao, United States Secretary of Transportation (CFR individual member) Jamie Dimon, Member of Strategic and Policy Forum (CFR corporate member) Jim Donovan, Deputy Treasury Secretary (CFR corporate member) Larry Fink, Member of Strategic and Policy Forum (CFR corporate member)
Neil M. Gorsuch, Supreme Court Justice (individual CFR member) Vice Admiral Robert S. Harward, National Security Advisor (declined appointment) (CFR corporate member)

Even though Trump wasn’t a CFR member outright, his cabinet is made up almost entirely of its members. As this information illustrates—democracy is an illusion. If ever you needed another reason to tune out of mainstream media and seek out information for yourself—this is it. It also explains why information like this, which challenges this worldview is under attack.

By Matt Agorist
Source: The Free Thought Project


A Council on Foreign Relations Report

Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation


Insights From a CFR WorkshopAugust 20, 2018     







French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and U.S. President Donald J. Trump confer at the Group of Twenty meeting in Hamburg, Germany, on July 7, 2017 John MacDougall/Reuters






In July 2018, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action convened a workshop to examine areas of cooperation between the United States and the European Union. The workshop was made possible by the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The views described here are those of the workshop participants only and are not CFR or Carnegie Corporation positions. The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government.

Introduction

Despite recent turbulence in the transatlantic relationship, the United States and the European Union share a common interest in managing emerging sources of global disorder. To explore prospects for and challenges to transatlantic cooperation, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations convened an international group of twenty-three experts at the Tufts University Center in Talloires, France, on July 12–13, 2018, for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation.” The workshop is the third in a series of meetings supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. It is premised on the belief that the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia not only share a common interest in preventing the world from becoming more dangerous and disorderly, but also that the nature and scope of this task necessitates cooperation among them.

Workshop participants discussed their perceptions of the growing sources of disorder in the world, examined areas of strategic cooperation, and explored where the United States and the European Union might work together to address a variety of regional concerns emanating from Africa, China, the Middle East, and Russia. While how the two can work together to address increasing political instability and violent conflict, participants also cited the importance of the transatlantic relationship in preventing or mitigating the demise of the liberal international order.

The Changing Domestic Context for Transatlantic Cooperation

Participants agreed that the United States and the European Union are facing a seismic shift in the global order. A Western agenda no longer determines global norms; rather, the West has fragmented and the digital age has undermined the social and international order, creating systemic social dislocation. Compounded by fears over the future of work and employment in the face of artificial intelligence, automation, and globalization, this dislocation is reflected in the rise of nationalism and nativism across the United States and the European Union. Domestic politics have merged with international trends.

Participants largely agreed that three domestic issues trouble most American voters: the future of work, the future of the U.S. immigration system, and the future role of the United States on the international stage. Several participants argued that the election of President Donald J. Trump reflects these voter concerns, and suggested that the post–World War II liberal international order has been an aberration in the arc of U.S. foreign policy.

Europe faces similar challenges. Participants posited that anxieties over work and globalization have prompted concerns about the future of the European Union and have contributed to the rise of the far right in EU member states such as Hungary and Poland as well as in Turkey. For some participants, the rise of the far right could be an indicator of the transatlantic alliance’s future: an alliance among far right parties focused on undermining global institutions. Moreover, participants agreed that the manipulation of public opinion will increasingly affect the future of political systems. Europe in particular has witnessed the manipulation and polarization of political parties and public opinion on issues like capitalism and free trade.

Anxieties over work and globalization have prompted concerns about the future of the European Union.

Acknowledging these trends, one participant stated that “the primary challenge facing the West is the West itself.” All participants agreed the United States and the European Union should work both independently and together to address the future of work, immigration, and socioeconomic integration and focus on sustaining a narrative of popular support for the transatlantic relationship in order to resolve the underlying issues of nationalism and populism. As the United States retreats from its global leadership role, one participant suggested that the European Union should continue to prepare for strategic autonomy and that “preparing for a post-American future is not inconsistent with preparing for the return of a future American partner.”

The Future of Global Governance

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All participants agreed that the election and subsequent actions of President Trump catalyzed the decline of the liberal international order. Global governing institutions were already under-performing before Trump assumed office, straining under numerous transnational challenges, but the Trump administration’s pursuit of U.S. autonomy and its apparent abandonment of global, multilateral leadership roles has resulted in the degradation of transatlantic relations.

Participants questioned whether the U.S. abdication of leadership represents a lack of trust in international institutions or an actual crisis of democracy. They also asked whether the transatlantic agenda will continue to uphold the liberal international order, or become simply transactional cooperation when needs collide (e.g., on regional security concerns in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and on strategic concerns over the future of cyberspace). The United States and the European Union continue to share common policy goals and interests, but the lack of predictability in U.S. foreign policy has resulted in what one participant described as a return to Hobbesian international relations.

Although U.S. and EU political leaders diverge over their strategic aims, participants agreed that agreements may still function in what one participant termed “compartmentalized cooperation.” The United States and the European Union remain broadly aligned on counterterrorism efforts, deterring cyber aggression, and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In contested areas, such as climate change, migration, outer space, and trade, participants suggested that subnational agreements (e.g., California Governor Jerry Brown’s climate change partnership with EU leaders) and civil society forums (e.g., French President Emmanuel Macron’s Paris Peace Forum) could function in the absence of high-level U.S. leadership.

But although participants accepted that compartmentalized cooperation will serve short-term interests, they disagreed over whether continued cooperation illustrates the resilience of the global governance system. Some participants argued that future cooperation will take place at the subnational level as short-term issues are favored over long-term strategic problems and that formal global governance will be substituted over time by informal, ad hoc cooperation on an array of issues.

Participants agreed that strategic autonomy will be critical in the absence of U.S. leadership.

For the European Union, participants agreed that strategic autonomy will be critical in the absence of U.S. leadership. One participant argued that the European Union should adopt a global strategy and approach democracy as a critical infrastructure project, clarifying how and why democracy matters. For the sake of the transatlantic alliance and the future of the West, participants agreed that the United States and the European Union should become advocates for the liberal international order or risk losing primacy to competing narratives from China and Russia.

Potential Areas of Regional Cooperation

Despite these concerns, participants identified four regions where the United States and the European Union could coordinate in areas of strategic interest to prevent conflict and potentially bolster the transatlantic alliance. Despite Russian aggression, participants agreed that the United States and the European Union should continue to hold dialogues and identified strategic arms control as one area of interest ripe for cooperation. Participants agreed that the United States and the European Union should remain in discussions with Russia on the New START and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaties. Participants also agreed that the United States and the European Union should adopt a unified approach to Russian cyber efforts, but acknowledged that the likelihood of reaching an agreement with Russia itself was slim.

Participants were more optimistic in discussing areas of U.S.-EU-Russia regional cooperation, particularly in the Middle East. Participants recognized that solutions to the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, and Syria would not be possible without including Russia in negotiations. However, to prevent Russia from overtaking transatlantic interests in the region, participants agreed that the United States and the European Union should adopt a unified transatlantic strategy (though they also acknowledged that creating such a strategy is not realistic under the Trump administration).

Finally, participants discussed the security architecture in Europe and suggested that the United States and the European Union work to deescalate tension with Russia by clarifying rules of the road for contact, including political interference. Participants suggested that dialogue would build a foundation for mutual confidence and cooperation that could cross over into other areas of strategic interest.

China

Participants agreed that China views global governance, trade, sovereignty, and human rights in a fundamentally different way than the United States and the European Union do, leaving opportunity for transatlantic coordination on areas of strategic interest. Unfortunately, participants also acknowledged that, given internal European politics and the Trump administration’s policies, it may be difficult for the United States and European Union to develop a cohesive China strategy. On trade, the United States and the European Union have been largely successful in advocating for stronger intellectual property protections, promoting market access, and coordinating pushback against laws and regulations discriminating against foreign entities. However, several participants noted that EU member states are divided in their response to Chinese investment and trade, as some EU states privilege short-term money flows over long-term consequences, thus making high-level U.S.-EU-China trade agreements difficult.

With Chinese President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, participants noted that China has asserted sovereignty claims more firmly in critical areas, including Taiwan and the South China Sea. Participants noted that the United States and European Union agree on the strategic importance of Taiwan and the South China Sea, but differ in their approaches to both. The United States has made Taiwan an important component of its China policy, while the European Union has not. In the South China Sea, the United States and European Union do coordinate on freedom of navigation operations, but differ in the manner in which they exercise their rights.In terms of future cooperation, participants agreed that the United States and European Union should continue to challenge China on its human rights violations, hold Xi to account on China’s climate change advocacy, attempt to reach an agreement with China on internet governance (which may be difficult given divergent U.S. and EU views), and work with China to establish common standards and lending regulations for its Belt and Road Initiative.

The Middle East

In the Middle East, participants agreed that the United States and the European Union share concerns over terrorism and the stabilization of Libya and Yemen, but diverge on approaches to Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Some participants also emphasized that, although the Middle East is geostrategically critical for EU security, EU member states do not follow a coordinated Middle East strategy. Moreover, several participants identified a potential flashpoint in U.S.-EU coordination in the Middle East over a possible Iran-Israel confrontation; they expressed misgivings over whether the United States and European Union would present a united transatlantic front in the face of armed conflict. Regardless, opportunities for cooperation exist and include counterterrorism initiatives and stabilization efforts across the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Participants flagged the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS as an example of multiple consecutive U.S. and European administrations sharing best practices, intelligence, and labor. As postconflict situations emerge, participants agreed that the United States and European Union will continue to coordinate on regional stabilization, but that the United States is less likely to commit itself to any long-term reconstruction efforts.

Africa

Participants agreed that the need for a coordinated transatlantic strategy toward Africa is paramount, as Africa faces the “perfect storm” of a demographic bulge, climate change, and the uncertainty of the future of work on the continent. However, although the United States and the European Union share concerns over migration, peacekeeping, and terrorism in Africa, participants recognized that a coordinated transatlantic approach may be difficult. The United States does not currently prioritize Africa in its foreign policy agenda, nor does it involve African countries in high-level dialogues, preferring bilateral interactions and military approaches to resolving conflict. Participants noted that the converse is true for Europe: African stability is critical for regional security, particularly as it affects migration, but the European Union often opts for diplomacy and multilateral initiatives over military operations.

Although the United States and the European Union have adopted different strategic approaches to African relations, participants identified several areas for a coordinated transatlantic strategy: counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel against international criminal and terrorist networks, democracy promotion in fragile states, and civil society and private sector work on climate change. Recognizing that current crises are the result of short-term policy and spillover from ongoing conflicts, participants agreed that the United States and the European Union should develop security agreements in Africa, focusing on economic and humanitarian tools to address the needs of younger generations. Participants concluded that diplomacy and prevention in Africa will be critical in handling the approaching perfect storm.

Recommendations
Participants noted that the international system faces fundamental, strategic, and systemic shifts that may outlast current U.S. and EU governments. Participants remain pessimistic that China and Russia will seek to keep the liberal international order as both countries see little incentive to do so and have experienced limited repercussions in deviating from established international norms. Participants also agreed that the United States and European Union are unlikely to adopt a cohesive transatlantic strategy toward China and Russia, but expressed hope for cooperation in other areas of strategic and regional importance, including in Africa and the Middle East.

As a result, participants suggested that the United States and European Union use this inflection point to reconsider the benefits of the liberal international order, and potentially ensure its survival by developing a cohesive strategy and pursuing the following: Identify areas where civil society and private sector actors can take the lead on contentious issues, including climate change. Pursue specific strategic areas of cooperation below the senior levels of government to maintain dialogue and ensure the pursuit of national security interests. Potential areas of cooperation include arms control agreements and counterterrorism efforts.

Prepare for European strategic autonomy, despite internal European political disputes. Though Europe is preparing for a post-American future, its efforts do not preclude the return of U.S. power.Empower the periphery: those actors who operate at the sub-state level. As societies grow increasingly interconnected, the traditional state-based framework may need to flex and allow for nonstate civil society actors to work on transnational issues.


May 16th revision - 5

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